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The EU Global Strategy in a Transitional International Order 
 
Edward Newman 
 
John GroomÕs many contributions to International Relations scholarship focus Ð 
among other topics Ð upon two interlinked themes. Firstly, this work engages with the 
nature and scope of the ÔEuropean projectÕ, and in particular the international relations 
of Western Europe. In this, Groom explores the EU and its place in the world, but he 
has also broken new ground in developing the (neo)functionalist theme in various 
contexts.1 Secondly, GroomÕs work has explored a wide range of topics related to the 
record, challenges and prospects for international organisations and global 
governance.2 This reflects a deep commitment to multilateralism as an essential 
aspect of a peaceful, just international society, while being sensitive to the realities of 
power. 
 
This article will explore both of these themes in parallel in order to consider the 
prospects for the EUÕs role as a global leader in a transitional international order, 
based on the assumption that multilateral principles will remain at the heart of global 
governance and, in the words of Groom, multilateralism will remain Òa way of life in 
Europe.Ó3 However, this article is less optimistic than GroomÕs work about the EUÕs 
future in this area, as long as the EU remains wedded to a model of global governance 
which is increasingly out of touch with contemporary realities, and because there are 
serious doubts about the normative and political authority of the EU in global 
perspective.  
 
The article will make a number of observations about the EUÕs global role in the 
context of fundamental shifts which suggest that the locus of political and economic 
power is increasingly situated in the non-Western world. This has significant 
implications for the viability of the EUÕs global agenda, and one of the core vehicles 
of that agenda, the architecture of global governance. The framework for this article 
therefore explores the political and normative traction of the EU, the prospects for 
																																																								
1
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global governance Ð given that European external action is inherently multilateral Ð 
and the changing global environment. This changing environment is defined by the 
relative increase in economic and political power and influence of countries such as 
China, India, Russia and Brazil, amongst others Ð countries which have demands 
which often put them at odds with the traditional guardians of international order. In 
turn, there are also changes in the challenges which confront international collective 
action mechanisms. At stake is whether the EU can successfully navigate a terrain of 
competing pressures, given the changing landscape as well as international political 
challenges. 
 
A key starting point for this analysis is the concept of a transitional international 
order. The Ôinternational orderÕ Ð as a coherent, unified set of practices Ð is a 
problematic idea. Much debate focuses on whether the liberal Ð or ÔWestern-ledÕ Ð 
international order has come to an end, and if the world is entering a new phase. Yet 
these are not discrete or neat phases or models where one ends and another begins, 
and there can be multiple forms and understandings of Ôinternational orderÕ operating 
in parallel. Nevertheless, it is broadly agreed that the international norms and 
institutions which regulate international relations Ð whether or not this is described as 
international order Ð are under transition and arguably under challenge. In this 
context, the European UnionÕs hopes to expand its global strategy around a 
reinvigorated vision of global governance are ambitious and potentially hazardous. As 
it engages with the world more, the EU will become embroiled in the political 
conflicts which result from the systemic changes of the transitional international 
order, as the relative power and influence of states rises and declines. As a 
consequence, the existing institutions and principles of global governance Ð in which 
the EU is heavily invested as a means of projecting European influence and pursuing 
its interests Ð are coming under increased strain. A further key starting point concerns 
the normative authority and reach of the EU Ð its Ônormative powerÕ Ð in the context 
of rapidly evolving internal and international circumstances. 
 
Considering the global role of the EU in a shifting international order, in conjunction 
with the evolving challenges faced by global governance, raises a number of 
questions:  How effective are the existing values and institutions of global governance 
in responding to evolving challenges and facilitating collective action? How is the rise 
of nationalism and protectionism affecting international commitments to global 
governance, and its capacity to address pressing global challenges? Are conventional, 
state-centric approaches to multilateral collective action effective in the face of 
complex 21st Century challenges? How have changes in the international order Ð in 
particular in terms of economic relationships Ð affected the capacity of existing forms 
of global governance? How can institutions of global governance be reformed in a 
way that makes them more effective, legitimate, and inclusive?  
 
The rest of this article will explore the prospects for the EUÕs 2016 Global Strategy in 
the context of these questions, around three principal trends and challenges for global 
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governance: political and normative challenges, legitimacy challenges, and systemic 
challenges. The article argues that the prospects for the EUÕs global role are limited as 
long as the EU remains committed to traditional forms of global governance, since the 
forward-looking aspects of the Global Strategy are insufficiently radical. Moreover, 
the normative authority of the EU Ð based upon liberal values Ð is increasingly in 
retreat as non-Western states challenge existing norms and Western-dominated 
principles of governance. This results in the weakening traction of EU authority Ð 
given the growing salience of alternative narratives Ð but also a self-imposed 
circumspection and pragmatism within Europe as European elites recognize the 
importance of working with powerful global actors which do not share EuropeÕs 
worldview. 
 
The EUÕs Global Strategy 
 
The 2016 State of the Union Address of the President of the EU Commission 
suggested that ÒOur European Union is, at least in part, in an existential crisisÓ.4 
Similarly, the 2016 EU Global Strategy stated that ÒWe live in times of existential 
crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat. Our 
European project, which has brought unprecedented peace, prosperity and democracy, 
is being questionedÓ.5 The general tone of European debate, amongst most national 
leaders and EU policy staff, has been about the need to pull the union together to 
prevent an unraveling of the European project, and focus upon core European 
interests Ð including security Ð rather than global norms.  
 
Nevertheless, at its core, the EU Ð and European elites generally Ð remain essentially 
committed to the post-Second World War international order, based upon liberal 
norms and a network of governance regimes. It is clear that the EU must strengthen 
its engagement with a broader range of international stakeholders, but the 
assumptions which underlie this engagement are increasingly in question. The 2016 
Global Strategy expressed a commitment to Òglobal norms and the means to enforce 
themÓ, and in particular a Òstrong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based 
orderÓ.6  Therefore, ÒGuided by the values on which it is founded, the EU is 
committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the 
UN Charter, which ensure peace, human rights, sustainable development and lasting 
access to the global commonsÓ.7 As a part of this vision, the Global Strategy commits 
the EU to a more active and influential European presence, in which Òthe EU will 
																																																								
4
 Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission. ÔState of the Union 2016. 
Towards a Better Europe Ð A Europe that Protects, Empowers and DefendsÕ. Brussels: 
Directorate-General for Communication (European Commission), 16 September 2016. 
5
 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Vice-President of 
the European Commission. ÔShared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global 
Strategy for the European UnionÕs Foreign and Security PolicyÕ. Brussels: European External 
Action Service, 2016, p.7. 
6
 Ibid., p.10 and p.39. 
7
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strengthen its voice and acquire greater visibility and cohesionÓ, including 
increasingly unified representation of the Euro area in the International Monetary 
Fund.8 
 
In policy terms, the Global Strategy states that the EU Òwill lead by exampleÓ by 
implementing commitments on sustainable development and climate change, 
including the Paris agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.9 The Strategy 
also reflects a commitment to arms control agreements and the further strengthening 
of free trade regimes. There are also ostensibly progressive ideas related to 
sustainable access to the global commons, multilateral digital governance, responsible 
space behaviour, more effective conflict prevention, the detection of and response to 
global pandemics, and working with non-state actors. 
The Global Strategy stresses the importance of reform of the UN and International 
Financial Institutions, based on the principles of accountability, representation, 
responsibility, effectiveness and transparency, noting that ÒResisting change risks 
triggering the erosion of such institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings 
to the detriment of all EU Member StatesÓ.10 However, this commitment to reform 
does not respond directly to the concerns of groupings such as the BRICS, comprising 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, whose demands for greater 
participation in international regimes go much further than that to which the EU is 
apparently prepared to commit.  
There is a strong assumption of the potential for EU leadership in the Global Strategy. 
It states that the EU will Òact as an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and 
facilitator within a networked web of playersÓ.11 This echoes earlier debates about the 
concept of Ônormative powerÕ and EuropeÕs capacity to shape norms related to a range 
of policy areas, and it provides a useful context to an analysis of the EUÕs potential to 
play a leadership role in support of global governance. According to the Ônormative 
power EuropeÕ idea, the EUÕs constitutive principles have internalized certain values 
within collective European society and policy. 12  In particular, peace, freedom, 
democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights are considered to be 
foundational and indivisible to the collective European identity, and in turn provide a 
normative worldview which has an impact externally through European external 
policy and through various forms of diffusion.13 As Manners argues, Ôthe most 
																																																								
8
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Constitutionalism beyond the state (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); H. 
Sjursen, ÒThe EU as a ÔNormativeÕ Power: How Can this be?Ó Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol.13, No. 2 (2006), pp.235-231. 
13
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important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it 
says, but what it isÕ.14 
These cosmopolitan values not only constitute the European identity, but in theory 
they contribute to a worldview that guides EuropeÕs interaction with external partners 
Ð for example, in promoting and supporting democracy, human rights, and good 
governance. They also represent a standard of practice to aspire to for those who wish 
to do business with Europe. For those societies in the European neighbourhood who 
wish to join the EU community, for example, these standards constitute a necessary 
benchmark to meet. From this perspective, EuropeÕs role as a global actor takes into 
account Ð in theory Ð not only the interests of Europe and European states, but a 
cosmopolitan commitment to certain standards of human welfare globally. 
 
According to this, Europe is therefore inherently normative as a function of its 
constitutive principles, and there is evidence of the diffusion effect of liberal values in 
a range of policy areas, in particular in the near abroad and the European 
neighbourhood, but also further afield. Moreover, this Ônormative powerÕ has been 
shown to play a role in areas such as conflict resolution,15 the movement to abolish 
the death penalty, democracy promotion, amongst others. This debate is relevant to 
the EUÕs engagement with global governance since the success of multilateralism 
rests, in part, upon the traction of certain norms in international politics which are 
indivisible from the European project. However, an effective role in support of global 
governance now rests not only upon what the EU is, but also what it does. If the EU is 
to make global governance a key policy platform for its international role, it will need 
to be underpinned by the normative reach and credibility of Europe. If the EU has the 
Ôability to shape conceptions of the ÒnormalÓ in international relationsÕ,16 then its 
embrace of multilateralism could signal a leadership role. 
 
However, the EU can no longer rely upon the attraction of its constitutive values for a 
global role Ð if it ever could. The idea of the normative power of Europe has been 
challenged on many fronts, and these challenges remain valid in terms of EuropeÕs 
Global Strategy. From an empirical perspective, the concept of normative power Ð 
how to define and measure it Ð has been questioned.17 The internal diversity of the 
																																																																																																																																																														
ÒEuropean Union ÔNormative PowerÕ and the Security ChallengeÓ, European Security, 
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Type. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.49, No. 6 (2011), pp.1183-1204; E. Kavalski, 
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European Union, in particular after waves of enlargement, presents a wide range of 
values and interests which defy the idea of a fixed, coherent value system. Questions 
have similarly been raised about the tension between the interests of the most 
powerful European states and their commitment to a common European position in 
external action.18 
 
Many scholars have also raised concerns about the legitimacy of the Ônormative 
powerÕ concept, whether promoted by example or through policies. It is all too easy to 
see in EuropeÕs Ônormative powerÕ an assumption of superiority over ÔotherÕ systems 
of justice and politics which it seeks to ÔcivilizeÕ.19 Clearly, the history of Europe and 
its engagement with regions across the globe Ð including colonization Ð raises 
sensitivities in terms of its own capacity to lead in relation to political and social 
organization. This legacy must be taken into account by European stakeholders in any 
attempt to promote the EUÕs role in global debates about justice and human rights, for 
example. The legitimacy of this normative authority is further brought into question 
by the rising assertiveness and power of non-Western states which are increasingly 
challenging and sometimes resisting Western-led norms. Moreover, the fragmentation 
and divisions within Europe Ð which cast doubt upon the integrity of the European 
project Ð also weaken its attempts to project normative leadership globally. 
As the Global Strategy notes, Òcredibility is essentialÓ for taking a leadership role.20 It 
also states, a number of times, that ÒThe EU will lead by exampleÓ.21 As a huge 
collective economic power, no one can doubt that the EUÕs influence in global trade 
and investment multilateralism will continue to have traction. However, given the 
internal divisions and fragmentation which exist within the EU, and the challenges to 
its global role which are inherent in a transitional international order, there are serious 
questions about the global leadership of the EU in political and normative terms. The 
following section will present the sources of these challenges, which confront both the 
EU and the values and institutions of global governance. 
Challenges to International Order and Conventional Global Governance 
 
																																																																																																																																																														
Encounters (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); H. Sjursen, ÒThe EU as a 
ÔNormativeÕ Power: How Can this be?Ó Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 
(2006), pp.235-231.  
18
 Adrian Hyde-Price, ÒNormativeÕ power Europe: a realist critiqueÓ, Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2006), pp.217-234. 
19
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Three principal trends and challenges have far-reaching implications for the EUÕs 
global engagement and the assumptions which lie behind its Global Strategy, and in 
particular its commitment to multilateral global governance. Given that the EU has so 
much invested in the values and institutions of multilateralism, and this provides a 
key vehicle for its global role, the challenges which confront global governance are 
also challenges which confront the EUÕs Global Strategy. 
 
Political and normative challenges 
Firstly, global governance faces a number of political and normative challenges, some 
of which are directly associated with the EU space. The rise of nationalism and 
protectionism globally, but notably in some Western countries, raise questions about 
the ability and willingness of powerful states to provide and maintain international 
public goods, traditionally regarded as being a mainstay of global governance. In 
addition, political challenges related to the transitional international order are 
exposing diverging interests amongst states whose support for global governance is 
essential, and acute conflicts related to Ôburden sharingÕ. The US is the key example 
of this, as a country which has traditionally been the primary sponsor of international 
organisations, but which is increasingly frustrated with the returns from its 
investment. The attitude of President Donald Trump illustrates this perfectly, although 
there were signs that the country was retreating from some of its international 
engagements prior to TrumpÕs election. The Presidential Memorandum Regarding 
Withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
issued in January 2017, was quite instructive: ÒIt is the policy of my Administration to 
represent the American people and their financial well-being in all negotiations, 
particularly the American worker, and to create fair and economically beneficial trade 
deals that serve their interests. Additionally, in order to ensure these outcomes, it is 
the intention of my Administration to deal directly with individual countries on a one-
on-one (or bilateral) basis in negotiating future trade dealsÉto promote American 
industry, protect American workers, and raise American wages.Ó In tone, this is 
representative of the broader US retreat from the provision of global goods and a shift 
towards protectionism Ð and perhaps also isolationism Ð related both to the declining 
capacity of the US and the rise of populist nationalism in that country. It is thus still 
pertinent to ask if the Ôinstitutional bargainÕ upon which the US created and 
maintained multilateral arrangements Ð accepting constraints upon its foreign policy 
and the material costs of supporting public goods, in return for regularity in 
international interactions and having its interests reflected in the international 
institutional architecture Ð is breaking down.22 This raises significant doubts about 
international order and global governance. Given that the US has been an essential 
supporter of global governance since the Second World War, the neo-isolationist 
signals emanating from the US since the beginning of 2017, even if they transpire to 
be exaggerated, raise questions about the sustainability of existing forms of global 
																																																								
22
 Edward Newman, A Crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security, 
Routledge, 2007, p.2. 
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governance. 
 
In contrast, in a kind of historic reversal of roles, at the 2017 Davos international 
leadersÕ meeting ChinaÕs President Xi Jinping made a plea for the maintenance of an 
open global economy, warning of the dangers of protectionism. Some have seen this 
as a leadership vision, touching as he did upon migration, globalization, development 
and global governance. However, there are doubts as to the capacity of China Ð and 
groupings such as the BRICS, comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa Ð to take on such a role. The Ôrising powersÕ have not presented a viable 
alternative vision of international order, or a convincing commitment to sponsor 
global public goods. 
 
Participation in decision-making and representation in the instruments of global 
governance are also increasingly contested, again raising fundamental doubts about 
the viability of the architecture of global governance. The rules of procedure and 
control established in many institutions of global governance in the mid-20th Century 
are considered by many states to be out of touch with contemporary realities. 
Specifically, many of these multilateral arrangements are perceived to be weighted in 
favour of Western interests, and under-represent other regions of the world, including 
regions which are experiencing a resurgence in influence and economic power.23 A 
recurring demand of the BRICS grouping in terms of international financial 
governance relates to reform in both the prevailing policies and the operating 
principles of international regimes. This frustration is almost always tied closely to 
the manner in which decisions are made, due to the constitutive nature of many of the 
global economic governance institution. These outmoded operating procedures 
challenge the legitimacy of these organizations Ð at least in the eyes of rising powers. 
Voting rights and representation in international financial regimes has been a major 
issue of contention, Ôwhich continues to undermine the credibility, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the IMF.Õ24 A further recurring theme in the discourse of rising 
powers is that Ôthe global economic governance system must reflect the profound 
changes in the global economic landscape, and the representation and voice of 
emerging markets and developing countries should be increased.Õ25 This represents a 
powerful demand for the regimes of global governance to better reflect the evolving 
balance of power, in terms of control of the agenda and decision-making processes. 
However, there is ample evidence that rising powers are not fundamentally 
challenging the underlying principles of international order, but rather they seek to 
																																																								
23
 This discussion draws upon Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala, ÔRising Powers and 
Order Contestation: Disaggregating the Normative from the RepresentationalÕ, Third World 
Quarterly, published online November 2017. 
24
 BRICS. Ufa Declaration (Ufa, the Russian Federation, 9 July 2015): 
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25
 Chinese PresidentÕs Office, ÒPresident Xi Jinping Gives Joint Interview To Media from 
BRICS CountriesÓ, 19 March 2013: 
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gain greater access to, and representation in, the institutions and processes which 
define, administer and uphold international rules.26 
 
As a result of frustration at the slow pace of change and reform, parallel forms of 
multilateralism have emerged, representing a fragmentation of global governance, and 
risking the further erosion of traditional organisations such as the UN, World Bank 
and WTO. Some of the new BRICS initiatives can therefore be seen as the 
establishment of parallel, or even competing, regimes. The New Development Bank 
and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement Ð with a total volume of $100 billion Ð 
came into effect in 2015. This will fund joint large-scale projects in transport and 
energy infrastructure and in industrial development Ð thus providing an alternative to 
the Western-dominated World Bank and IMF. The BRICS Export Credit Agencies 
and the BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism expand the BRICS countries 
financial cooperation and promote investment amongst BRICS members. It is 
interesting that the EUÕs Global Strategy warns that a lack of reform in existing 
international organizations risks the emergence of alternative groupings, because 
surely this is no longer just a risk. It is already happening. 
 
In addition, this transitional international order has generated normative contestation 
about the manner in which key international issues Ð such as human right and armed 
conflict Ð should be managed, and this has often stymied existing international 
organisations, such as the UN in relation to the Syrian conflict. Following the Libyan 
intervention of 2011, China and Russia repeatedly blocked UN action on Syria, 
cautioning against ÔWestern interventionismÕ and stressing the importance of SyriaÕs 
legitimate government. This pointed to a tension between pluralist approaches to 
human rights Ð  which are underpinned by a Westphalian, statist worldview, and an 
emphasis upon noninterference Ð and a more liberal worldview, which has a 
contingent view of sovereignty. 27  These political and normative conflicts have 
generated serious obstacles to fruitful collaboration in the instruments of global 
governance between powerful countries. The EU has been associated with a 
assertively liberal approach to international human rights Ð reflected in its human 
security doctrine28 Ð but this is clearly not in line with the worldview of the rising 
powers which will likely define the changing international order. Again, this suggests 
that the success of the EUÕs Global Strategy will require it to revisit Ð and possibly 
revise Ð some of the foundations of its external action. 
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 Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala, ÔRising Powers and Order Contestation: 
Disaggregating the Normative from the RepresentationalÕ. 
27
 This discussion draws upon Edward Newman, ÒWhat prospects for common humanity in a 
divided world? The scope for RtoP in a transitional international orderÓ, International 
Politics, Vol. 53, No.1 (2016) pp.32Ð48. See also X. Pu, ÒSocialisation as a two-way process: 
Emerging powers and the diffusion of international normsÓ, The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, (2012), pp.341Ð367.  
28
 Mary Martin and Mary Kaldor, eds., The European Union and human security: external 
interventions and missions, (London: Routledge, 2009). 
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Legitimacy challenges to global governance 
Many instruments of global governance, reflecting an ethos of Ôhigh politicsÕ 
dominated by elites, do not uphold 21st Century expectations of governance, including 
principles of accountability, transparency and representation. This is a further 
weakness that the EU will need to overcome if it wishes to continue to invest a major 
part of its global interactions in global governance. Civil society actors have 
struggled, with very limited success, for greater access and inclusion, in the face of 
lack of reform and stagnation within existing multilateral organisations.29 This lack of 
progress has resulted in a high level of disengagement and antipathy towards 
multilateralism on the part of many citizens, for whom trust in international 
organisations is severely tested. 30  The Ôanti-globalization movementÕ directly 
associates international organizations Ð particularly international financial institutions 
Ð with a hegemonic, neo-liberal agenda. But more generally, in liberal societies Ð 
traditionally, the key supporters of global governance Ð this has contributed to 
declining support for multilateralism. The election of President Donald Trump and the 
UKÕs referendum vote to leave the European Union are both a reflection of this 
broader antipathy. 
 
Past efforts to integrate non-governmental organisations and citizensÕ groups into 
global governance have generated some limited progress and point to future 
promise. 31  As an example, the appointment process for UN Secretary-General 
Antnio Gutterres in 2016 was widely seen as the most transparent and inclusive in 
the history of the organization, in large part because of the involvement of civil 
society.32 The Ô1 for 7 BillionÕ movement represented hundreds of civil society groups 
globally in a widely-supported campaign to reform the appointment process of the 
Secretary-General in order to make it more meritocratic. The appointment process 
was certainly more transparent than any which had occurred before, with formal 
candidates being nominated and participating in public consultations in which they 
shared their vision for the UN and their plans for dealing with the many challenges 
which exist. The EUÕs Global Strategy also makes a commitment to work with civil 
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 Thomas G. Weiss, WhatÕs Wrong with the United Nations and how to Fix it, (New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, 2016). 
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 Nora McKeon, The United Nations and Civil Society: Legitimating Global Governance Ð 
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32
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society in a more inclusive form of global governance.33 Yet global governance 
remains fundamentally inter-governmental, and this is damaging its reputation and 
losing public support, which in turn undermines state support for public goods and 
fuels protectionism. But aside from questions of legitimacy, the state centricity of 
global governance has also constrained its effectiveness, given that many global 
challenges defy a Westphalian conception of collective action. 
 
Systemic challenges 
In many ways 21st Century challenges defy the constitutive nature and capacities of 
conventional multilateral approaches and arrangements, resulting in functional 
failings and problems of Ôoutput legitimacyÕ, defined as the ability of an entity to 
perform according to reasonable expectations of effectiveness. The evolving 
environment has been described as Ôpost-WestphalianÕ: a world where notions of 
inviolable and equal state sovereignty are breaking down or otherwise challenged; 
where states are no longer the sole or even the most important actors in certain areas 
of international politics; where the Ônational interestÕ cannot be defined in one-
dimensional terms; where power takes many different forms, both soft and hard; and 
where the distinction between ÔdomesticÕ and ÔinternationalÕ politics is irreversibly 
blurred.34 The complexity of some challenges has increased exponentially, and for 
others Ð such as internet governance Ð state-centric approaches are arguably 
unsuitable. A number of key areas of international policy are arguably no longer Ð if 
they ever were Ð state centric in terms of their nature and the type of framework 
which is necessary to tackle them. Non-state actors and trans-border stresses are key 
features of armed conflict in the 21st Century, and threats to international security are 
more likely to emanate from weak or failing, rather than strong, states. Civil wars Ð 
rather than the interstate wars between great powers envisaged by the founders of the 
UN as the primary challenge to peace Ð have been the defining form of organized 
violence. Climate change, international finance, and global health Ð amongst many 
other policy areas Ð also arguably defy a state-centric approach based around national 
trade-offs and compromises. The result is rising skepticism and declining respect 
towards traditional international regimes and organizations in terms of their ability to 
address the most pressing global challenges, which raises the risk of alternative, 
fragmented forms of multilateralism.  
 
These policy challenges also strain traditional multilateral assumptions, such as what 
Keohane calls Ôdiffuse reciprocity,Õ whereby members can expect to receive roughly 
equivalent benefits over time, if not necessarily on every decision or occasion.35 It is 
increasingly questionable whether this institutionalist logic remains fully valid in the 
face of the challenges facing global governance in the 21st Century, as the world 
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becomes ever more divided and challenges become more complex.36 Alternative 
multilateral arrangements established amongst the BRICS countries are a reflection of 
a shift away from the idea of global governance towards differentiated governance, 
and the rise of nationalism and protectionism in parts of the Western world suggest 
that the principles of reciprocity may be eroding. 
 
These systemic challenges suggest that rigid multilateral institutions cannot hope to 
be respected indefinitely when their constitutive principles and performance do not 
meet expectations in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness. The result is that powerful 
states circumvent established international organizations in key areas, and also form 
alternative and sometimes informal coalitions for taking action. Global governance 
remains at the heart of the EUÕs external action, but it is increasingly questionable 
whether this will be an effective vehicle for the EUÕs Global Strategy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Debates about global governance have been dominated by ideas related to the 
emergence and resilience of international norms, including questions of leadership, 
norm adaptation and contestation. These debates remain relevant to understanding the 
challenges faced by global governance, since changes in international order have 
clearly strained the effectiveness of some multilateral organisations and the norms 
which underpin them. In particular, the transitional international order has exposed 
problems of legitimacy in terms of the constitutive makeup of the instruments of 
global governance, since they are not sufficiently representative of the shifts in 
influence and authority in international relations which have occurred in recent 
decades. This aspect of global governance is a vital realm of interaction between 
different stakeholders in global governance, including the EU, the US, China, Russia, 
India, Brazil, and other countries. Re-envisioning global governance involves, to a 
significant degree, a renegotiation of rules and institutions amongst such stakeholders, 
on the basis of mutual interests. It must start with an acknowledgement of how the 
world has changed since many of the foundations of global governance were 
established in the second half of the 20th Century. 
 
Even if the EU was not facing severe internal crises, the changing international order 
is less and less conducive to Europe playing a global leadership role. If ÔNormative 
Power EuropeÕ ever had traction, it is certainly in retreat, in the context of global 
norm contestation. The Global Strategy emphasizes the need for a Òrules based global 
orderÉguided by principlesÓ and an Òidealistic aspirationÓ. At the same time, the 
Strategy expresses an Òaspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the existing 
systemÓ of global governance. This can be interpreted as either progressive Ð in the 
context of the EUÕs liberal traditions Ð or realistic, given that the EUÕs powerful 
international partners are making demands which are not being adequately 
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accommodated by existing forms of institutionalized multilateralism. What is 
increasingly clear is that the EUÕs global authority, and its ability to play a role in 
establishing the architecture of global governance in the future, cannot rest upon its 
normative influence alone Ð or perhaps at all. It needs to embrace a more radical 
transformation of global governance which is a genuine break from the post-war 
mindset. At the same time, it needs to make a choice about the role that normative 
principles should play in its global engagement, given that its partnerships with 
powerful global actors which do not share a liberal outlook will demand ever greater 
pragmatism on the part of the EU. 
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